If we are ever to find a way out of the ecological and environmental mess we currently find ourselves in then we have to think in radically different ways about the economy and the environment. We have to question the basic principles and rationale that drive our pursuit of economic activity, work and production. And we will have to look anew at how we are constrained and shaped by Nature, and how we limit it.
Giorgos Kallis' short, polemical and thoroughly readable book is a challenging invitation to tackle all of these daunting tasks -and a means of doing so. Beginning with Malthus, moving onto economics, environmentalism and then onto ancient Greece, Kallis explores the notion of limits and how they have long shaped the way in which we govern and construct our societies and economies, our visions for both and environmentalist resistance to them.
At the heart of Kallis' argument is a simple proposition. Limits do not inhere in Nature. They are not given. Limits derive from our will and desires. Gravity limits us if we want to fly, but not when we want to dive into the sea. The boundaries of a forest reserve limit farmers who wish to expand their agriculture, and conservationists who want to extend the habitat of threatened species. The same line confounds people who wish to move in opposite directions. If we seem bound by limits, then we must ask not just 'How might we surpass these boundaries?', but also 'What desires have produced these limits'? As Kallis puts it:
'A limit presupposes a goal . . . a limit resides in the subject and the intention, not in nature . . . and it is our intentions that should be limited.' (58-9) Part of the fun of this book is its treatment of Malthus, who is exhumed, revived and then executed again -but properly this time. Drawing on published sources (the work of Robert Mayhew, Frank Elwell and others) Kallis shows that Malthus has been misinterpreted. Malthus did not believe that we will inevitably be bound by limited food production and that population will collapse. Rather he made the empirical point that population has not grown geometrically because it has been thus constrained. Malthus was trying to use what he thought was science -the facts about population growth and food availability -to show that an equal society was logically impossible.
The key point here is the assumptions which underpinned that belief. Malthus believed that we had a God-given duty to have as many children as possible, and that we could not constrain our wants and desires. People can tolerate no limits, they will always want more. It was because of our limitless desires that the available food will never be enough.
For Malthus, therefore, our voraciousness was a given. The best solution to the problems it posed was to accept the poverty and inequality it produced. Scarcity prompted the industry and productivity necessary to provide for more food which would reduce the frequency and severity of the shortages that constrained population growth. Malthus was wrong not because he failed to foresee the productivity of fossil-fuel powered agriculture. Greater productivity was his prime goal. Malthus was wrong because he insisted that humans are -and should be -limitless. As Kallis observes 'What Malthus refused to allow for was not that we could limit our numbers, but that we could limit our numbers and be happy' (page 23 emphasis in the original) Kallis shows clearly that this thinking about limits persists in economics and environmentalism. Some varieties of contemporary environmentalism are still trapped by wrong thinking about limits. Were we to think of environmental limits to growth, peak oil, or planetary boundaries as things which must ultimately limit our inevitable need for growth, our fundamentally limitless desires, we make Malthus' mistake. The limits recognised here are external to us -they create scarcity.
Modern economics is built on scarcity. It is 'the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses' (Robbins 1932 : 16, cited in Kallis 2019 . But it is more accurate to say that the production of scarcity is foundational to many varieties of capitalism. Malthus argued against poor laws because he wanted the poor to seek labour and employment to be productive. As Hickel has pointed out (Hickel 2019) , this is similar to David Cameron's advocacy of austerity policies to discourage shirkers. South African labour reserves, which were foundational to the production racist varieties of capitalism, worked because they created scarcity and forced people to seek jobs in the mines. The creation of scarcity drives many value chains: diamonds, despite being relatively abundant, are rendered scarce because their supply is restricted. Perceptions of scarcity, and distinction, create positional goods.
And this brings us to the central challenge, and irony of Kallis' argument. He wants us to will our own limits, to recognise that we can choose not to want the Earth. But doing so requires recognising that our current limits, our present forms of scarcity, are already socially constructed. Instead he asks us, albeit rather implicitly, to consider the possibility that we actually live in an abundant Earth which already has all that we could reasonably want, if we just thought again about what those reasonable wants might be. Kallis, G. Limits. Why Malthus was Wrong and Why Environmentalists Should Care. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 2019. (pp. 168) . Paperback $14.00 (ISBN-10: 1503611558 ISBN-13: 978-1503611559).
Book review
Kallis way of examining this is to go back, close to his home, to explore the cultures of ancient Greece, where he builds on Seaford's histories to suggest that ancient Greeks were horrified at the limitless possibilities of accumulation that a new invention -money -offered. He even, following Sleaford, suggests that 'Greek culture can be read as a reaction to the unlimited power of money that was just beginning to be released.' (page 78) Fascinating though this was I think Kallis could have made this point more strongly because there are multiple accounts in anthropology of how societies have responded to money -and ways of ordering our lives which are not built on untrammelled growth. Taussig has described how groups in Colombia, who would not use money in ways which yielded interest, and could not understand how others did (Taussig 1977) . Pastoralists in Tanzania used to 'buy shillings' by exchanging the real source of wealth (livestock) for money at cattle markets to pay newly imposed taxes. In ancient Israel, Leviticus (25: 8-13) instructed Jews to celebrate a year of 'jubilee' every 50 years in which sold land was returned to its original owner and slaves were freed. We need to make strange the primacy of growth that so obsesses us now. As Kallis points out (page 42), we need to see it as an aberration and the exception. And this requires understanding better the multiple alternatives, beyond ancient Greece, that have flourished in the absence of growth imperatives.
Indeed, anthropological investigations into social encounters with money, and ideas about money, have formed a significant, and well-known field within that discipline for decades (Gudeman 1986 ). Kallis' argument is in some ways, just an appeal to reject formalist approaches to economics (which explores rational responses to scarce options) and embrace substantivist approaches which presume neither scarcity nor rationality but asks simply, how, and why, do people make the livings they do. This book is part of a broader argument Kallis makes that advocates a substantivist understanding of the economy (Kallis 2018) .
Nonetheless even if it could have been empirically richer, one of the great strengths of this book is its clarity. The prose is plain, lively and straightforward. It is instantly accessible. It is a hard work to fault at all. However, if you look hard enough, two elisions appear. They are not silences. They are, appropriately enough, probably self-imposed restrictions on the text. It is instructive to explore them.
In the first instance the idea of an abundant earth could have been expounded more clearly. Kallis' makes clear that 'Malthus imagined a limited world in order to justify growth' (page 27). He celebrates the abundant world that Romantics contemplated (page 30). He insists that it is 'when we truly believe that the world is abundant that we will limit ourselves' (page 120 emphasis in the original). But he does not tackle clearly enough what an abundant earth might mean, which is a shame because his clarity on so important a concept would be a great benefit.
I have gone to Jason Hickel, Kallis' close collaborator, for more insight into this notion (Hickel 2019) . It was worth doing because it was so refreshingly radical and challenging. On the one hand this idea seems just ridiculous. How can there possibly be an abundant earth? House prices and land prices in our cities make them unaffordable for most people. Our roads are crowded with cars, our air thick with pollutants, our seas with plastics. Forests are disappearing because we do not have enough agricultural land. Poverty, as measured by realistic poverty lines, is increasing. Surely the only things in abundance are viruses, resistant bacteria, rats, seagulls, waste, want and agricultural deserts?
But such objections substantially misunderstand the argument. Theories of abundance do not mean that we begin to think that oceans are big places and can probably take a bit more plastic. Rather they take the facts of, for example, albatross death due to plastic seriously. They go to the root of the problem by challenging the drive to create more scarce private goods, and replace it with more abundant public goods.
Far from denying these crises, imagining an abundant earth begins with them. It postulates radical, world-saving ideas that could render current scarcity into abundance. These ideas are currently almost unthinkable, they would certainly never be taken seriously by policy makers. But, because they are not built on assumptions of scarcity, and postulates of limitless desires, because they are extensions of the question 'How could we limit ourselves?' they are, potentially, invaluable.
Take house prices in London for example (this is Hickel's example) what if we were to cap house prices, gradually, so that in fact they were slowly to decline? Or crowded roads -would they still be crowded if we taxed ownership (especially multiple car ownership) and invested the proceeds in public transport? What if the vices of poverty were tackled with living wages and basic income support that were paid for by higher taxes. What if our ideologies, films, books, TV series and multiple forms of soft power were not built on a celebration of inequality, power and growth?
The second surprising quietness is the number of times 'degrowth' is mentioned. Kallis is well known as a scholar working on degrowth (D'Alisa et al. 2015) . This is a complicated constellation of ideas that seeks to challenge the primacy of growing GDP as a foundational condition for prosperity. Degrowth can be misunderstood as the promotion of scarcity -of having less of everything. But this gets things the wrong way round. Degrowth is not the economics of scarcity, as Hickel points out (2019). Rather it is the other way around. Growth is built on scarcity. Degrowth posits that we already live in an abundant world. We just need to adjust our values and lives to see it that way.
Given all that, it is curious that in this book so little mention is made of degrowth. I wonder if this is deliberate. Degrowth means many things, it contains diverse, contradictory schools, that include managed recession, steady state economies, to promoting growth but using different metrics of change. Rather than getting stuck in those debates, Kallis here has taken another track. He begins not with degrowth, but with a core idea -limits -which if we rethink make many of the concepts of degrowth become logical and reasonable.
Limits / 65
As Kallis makes plain throughout, many of the arguments he voices are not new. But their assembly into so provocative and thoughtful a book certainly is. Contemporary capitalism is riven with the notion of transcending our limits and this mistake needs stating as plainly and as enticingly as possible. Kallis achieves this while largely avoiding contentious, and confusing, terms like 'degrowth'. Yet he is introducing one of the key concepts of degrowth to new audiences, in a thin, highly readable cheap new book that undergraduates will enjoy absorbing. He starts not with ideas that are dismissed out of hand, but with fresh insights into one of the most talked about, if mistaken, thinkers of the last two hundred years. So, all in all, this is a clever and passionate work. I hope it gets the wide readership it deserves.
